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93 
OBLIGATION, ANARCHY, AND 
EXEMPTION 
AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES 
OF AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY. By 
Abner S. Greene.1 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 2012. Pp. ix + 333. $49.95 (cloth). 
Micah Schwartzman2 
People embrace philosophical anarchism for different 
reasons. Sometimes anarchists adopt this view, which holds in 
part that there is no general moral duty to obey the law,3 because 
they are disillusioned with or alienated from the modern state, 
which they may believe is oppressive, exploitative, or unjust. 
Others may be attracted by utopian ideals that have difficulty 
flourishing under existing political regimes. Sympathy for 
anarchism might also arise from confrontation with laws 
believed to be draconian, morally obtuse, or worse—for 
example, drug laws, prohibitions on homosexual conduct, or 
mandatory military conscription. In some cases, people become 
skeptical about the existence of political obligations because, 
despite the best efforts of generations of political philosophers, 
they have yet to encounter a persuasive argument for the 
proposition that states have a moral right to command their 
general obedience.4 
 
 1. Leonard F. Manning Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. 
 2. Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. For helpful comments 
and discussions, I thank Leslie Kendrick, James Nelson, and Richard Schragger.  
 3. As discussed below, see infra notes 23–24 and accompanying text, philosophical 
anarchists not only reject political obligation but also the legitimacy of all existing states. 
For defenses of this view, see ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 
(1970); A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (1979); 
Joseph Raz, The Obligation to Obey the Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON 
LAW AND MORALITY 233–49 (2d ed. 2009).  
 4. See A. JOHN SIMMONS, JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY: ESSAYS ON RIGHTS 
AND OBLIGATIONS 102–04 (2001) (describing various motivations for philosophical 
anarchism). 
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Yet another path to philosophical anarchism might begin 
with reflection on the problem of religious exemptions from 
generally applicable laws. Twenty years ago, in the aftermath of 
Employment Division v. Smith,5 Abner Greene proposed a novel 
theory for why the state ought to provide constitutional religious 
exemptions.6 He argued that the two Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment—the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause—were best interpreted as balancing against 
each other. Under the Establishment Clause, laws must be based 
primarily on secular purposes, rather than on religious convic-
tions. The reason is that religious beliefs are not publicly 
accessible, and so relying expressly on such beliefs to justify laws 
would unfairly exclude nonbelievers. But at the same time, 
limiting the role of religious beliefs in the democratic process 
effectively excludes religious believers. Since their views are not 
represented in the process, they have no reason to obey the laws 
produced by it. To remedy this problem, the Free Exercise 
Clause provides religious exemptions from the law. If believers 
have no say in how the law is made, then at the very least, the 
law should account for their exclusion by accommodating them 
to the extent possible.7 
Initially, this argument for religious exemptions might seem 
like a fairly straightforward application of a political process 
theory. Religious citizens are disadvantaged in the democratic 
process. As a result, courts should exercise judicial review in a 
manner that provides them with special protections in the form 
of constitutional exemptions from laws that substantially burden 
their beliefs and practices. But this theory can point toward 
more radical and anarchical possibilities. If citizens are owed 
legal exemptions because they have no reason to obey laws 
resulting from an exclusionary political process, perhaps they 
should receive exemptions whenever they conscientiously object 
to laws that they otherwise have no duty to obey. After all, 
political exclusion is only one reason why citizens might lack 
political obligations. If there are others, then perhaps the state 
should widen the scope of its legal exemptions to cover them as 
well. 
In Against Obligation, Abner Greene develops this general 
line of argument. Without abandoning his earlier balancing 
 
 5. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 6. Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 
1611 (1993). 
 7. Id. at 1634. 
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theory of the Religion Clauses, he now argues for a broader and 
more ambitious set of claims focused on the idea of “permeable 
sovereignty,” which holds that citizens have a plurality of 
obligations based on their religious and philosophical views, 
family responsibilities, ethnic and tribal affiliations, and so on (p. 
20). These sources of obligation may conflict with the state’s 
demands, and Greene argues that there is no reason to privilege 
the latter. Citizens should treat all of their obligations as having 
equal standing, rather than giving presumptive weight to their 
political obligations (pp. 2, 117). Moreover, Greene argues, 
when citizens have competing duties and lack political 
obligations, states should provide them with a form of exit 
through legal exemptions, unless doing so would threaten 
compelling state interests (p. 118). 
In addition to rejecting conventional accounts of political 
obligation, Greene devotes two substantial chapters to arguing 
against what he calls “interpretive obligation” (p. 11), which 
includes fidelity to constitutional law and modes of legal 
interpretation that require deference to past authorities (such as 
original meaning or precedent) and to interpretive authorities 
(such as the Supreme Court). Just as citizens have plural sources 
of obligations that compete with their political obligations, legal 
interpreters confront diverse sources of legal meaning, none of 
which should be given presumptive authority. In short, according 
to Greene, citizens and public officials should both reject the 
general idea of fidelity to the law. 
In showing how attacks on political obligation are 
continuous with challenges to constitutional fidelity and judicial 
supremacy, Against Obligation demonstrates the sustained force 
of a skeptical approach to a broad array of claims concerning 
legal authorities. Densely argued and provocative, the book 
should be of interest to lawyers concerned about matters of 
religious freedom, constitutional interpretation, and the obliga-
tions of judges and political officials. It should also interest 
philosophers who may be somewhat less familiar with the 
constitutional and judicial implications of a skeptical or 
anarchical approach to political obligation. 
In what follows, after summarizing Greene’s main argu-
ments against political obligation and in favor of exemptions, I 
raise two questions about the position defended in the first half 
of the book, while leaving aside for purposes of this review the 
interesting and important discussions of interpretive obligations 
presented in the later chapters. The first question is whether 
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Greene is committed to philosophical anarchism, despite his 
repeated and emphatic protestations to the contrary. The second 
is whether Greene’s account of political obligation and his 
conception of permeable sovereignty are adequate to support a 
full range of religious exemptions, including some paradigmatic 
examples. Even if there are reasons to deny political obligation 
and to adopt a view near to, and perhaps identical with, 
philosophical anarchism, that theory may not be well-suited to 
justifying accommodations for many citizens who confront the 
law with competing religious and moral obligations. For those 
who aim to defend a robust exemption regime, anarchism may 
be less helpful in many cases than more conventional arguments 
based on the values of freedom and equality. 
I. FROM OBLIGATION TO EXEMPTION 
The first half of Against Obligation is devoted to 
establishing two claims: first, that citizens lack general duties to 
obey the law and, correlatively, that states have no authority to 
impose them; and second, that states should provide legal 
exemptions as a partial remedy for their political illegitimacy. 
Before raising some questions about these claims, I provide a 
brief summary of Greene’s main arguments for them. 
A. REJECTING POLITICAL OBLIGATION 
Greene begins his attack on political obligation by offering 
some parameters for his argument. He describes political 
obligations as moral requirements—whether duties or 
obligations8—to obey the law. These requirements are prima 
facie (or, more accurately, pro tanto) obligations, which are 
taken to be defeasible or open to being overridden by conflicting 
obligations. Such obligations are also content-independent, 
meaning that one has a duty to obey the law simply because it is 
the law, rather than because there is a moral reason to comply 
with the content of the law. Furthermore, political obligations 
must be general in the sense of applying to “all laws at all times” 
(p. 15), as well as to all citizens. In sum, Greene follows standard 
 
 8. Since nothing here turns on the distinction, I shall follow Greene in using the 
terms “duty” and “obligation” interchangeably as describing moral requirements. But see 
SIMMONS, supra note 3, at 14–15 (discussing various differences between duties and 
obligations). 
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accounts of defining political obligation as a general, content-
independent, defeasible, moral duty to obey the law (pp. 14–20).9 
Greene also endorses and defends the correlativity thesis, 
which holds that a state’s political legitimacy is correlative with 
the existence of its citizens’ political obligations (pp. 24–29).10 
Although Greene does not discuss the Hohfeldian logic of this 
thesis, the basic idea is that a legitimate state has a claim right to 
rule and that citizens have a correlative duty to obey. If citizens 
have no political obligations, then a state cannot have a right to 
rule. Thus, if a state’s legitimacy is defined in terms of it having 
such a right, then the rejection of political obligation is also a 
rejection of the state’s political legitimacy. As Greene writes, 
“[P]olitical legitimacy is correlated with political obligation—
when one is present so is the other; when one is absent so is the 
other” (p. 27). Somewhat confusingly, Greene calls this the 
“justification conception” of political legitimacy (p. 32),11 but I 
shall refer to it simply as the correlativity conception. 
In contrast to this standard view of political legitimacy, 
Greene describes a second and more minimal account, which 
holds that a state is legitimate whenever it maintains a 
functioning legal system consistent with basic rule of law values 
(p. 24). We might call this the legality conception. Greene argues 
that it is too thin to support political obligations. A more robust 
conception of legitimacy would add to the requirements of 
legality demands for democratic participation and institutional 
rules that satisfy a threshold of political justice. But Greene 
claims that even a state that meets these additional demands 
does not have the right to alter the moral duties of its subjects 
and to require their obedience (p. 25). 
In rejecting the legality (and somewhat thicker) conceptions 
of legitimacy, Greene effectively replicates an important 
distinction, drawn by A. John Simmons, between justification 
and legitimacy. According to Simmons, a state is justified when it 
 
 9. See William A. Edmundson, State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law, 10 
LEGAL THEORY 215, 215–17 (2004) (“The obligation at issue . . . is usually taken to be 
prima-facie, comprehensively applicable, universally borne, and content-independent.”). 
 10. For criticisms of the correlativity thesis, see Arthur Isak Applbaum, Legitimacy 
Without the Duty to Obey, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215 (2010); KENT GREENAWALT, 
CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 47–61 (1989). 
 11. I say confusingly because, as discussed below at notes 12–14 and accompanying 
text, it is possible to distinguish between the concepts of justification and legitimacy. See 
SIMMONS, supra note 4, at 126–30. I think Greene’s terminology makes it more difficult 
to track the content of this distinction. It might make sense to do that if he rejected the 
force of the distinction, but he appears to accept it. 
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is “on balance morally permissible (or ideal) and . . . rationally 
preferable to all feasible nonstate alternatives.”12 A justified 
state may generate or maintain important public goods, such as 
an effective legal system and just political and economic 
institutions. But this is not sufficient for a state to acquire 
legitimacy, which Simmons describes as the state’s moral right 
“to be the exclusive imposer of binding duties on its subjects, to 
have its subjects comply with these duties, and to use coercion to 
enforce the duties.”13 On this view, a just state might be justified 
but nevertheless illegitimate, at least in the sense of lacking the 
exclusive right to create, impose, and coercively enforce moral 
duties upon those within its jurisdiction.14 
To bridge the gap between a state’s justification and its 
legitimacy, at least under something like the correlativity 
conception, requires an argument showing that citizens have a 
duty to obey states that have certain positive moral attributes 
(e.g., legality or justice) or that produce certain public goods 
(e.g., stability, the rule of law, democratic participation). Like 
others who are skeptical about political obligation, Greene 
claims that no such argument is available. He groups existing 
accounts of political obligation into three categories: agent-
centered, status-based, and state-centered (pp. 6–8). Agent-
centered arguments focus on actions taken by a state’s subjects 
that might give rise to political obligation. These include most 
famously consent and its weaker cousin, tacit consent, as well as 
fair play theories and arguments based on the value of political 
participation. An account is status-based when it relies on role-
based or positional obligations. For natural duty theories, the 
relevant role is the subject of a just (or justified) state, whereas 
theories of associative obligation emphasize citizens’ special 
obligations to their compatriots. Finally, state-centered accounts 
focus on the need for states to provide political stability, social 
coordination, institutional settlement, and other important 
public goods. 
 
 12. Id. at 126. 
 13. Id. at 130. 
 14. One could accept the conceptual distinction between justification and 
legitimacy but argue that a state’s justification may be sufficient, at least in some cases, to 
establish its legitimacy. Like Simmons, Greene clearly rejects this view. But for a com-
peting account, see JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT PERFECTION (2011), ch. 
4. Quong defines legitimacy in terms of the state’s right to impose and coercively enforce 
duties on agents, although he stops short of saying that legitimacy entails a duty to obey 
the law. For present purposes, however, the important contrast is with the claim that 
legitimacy may be a function of a state’s justification. As Quong writes, “[A] certain kind 
of liberal state is justified and is legitimate for that reason.” Id. at 109 (emphasis added). 
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In the first (and longest) chapter of the book, Greene sets 
about demolishing all of these accounts of political obligation 
(pp. 35–113). Although developed with nuance and sophistica-
tion, the main lines of argument are familiar from the existing 
literature, and I will not rehearse them here. The basic strategy, 
pioneered by John Simmons more than thirty years ago,15 is to 
line up the various positive accounts and show how they, 
singularly and in combination, fail for one or more reasons. 
If there is a unifying thread or theme to Greene’s attack on 
political obligation, however, it is usefully summed up in his 
invocation of “rule-sensitive particularism” (p. 100).16 Morally 
responsible individuals cannot blindly follow the rules (or laws) 
imposed by the state. Because they confront a plurality of 
conflicting sources of moral obligation, they must continuously 
evaluate the balance of reasons available to them in particular 
contexts. In their decision-making, they ought to take into 
account the systemic benefits of following the law as the state 
demands. But there is no reason, on Greene’s view, to think that 
the state is either morally or epistemically better situated than 
individuals to determine whether, all-things-considered, they 
ought to obey the law. That judgment is always a particular one, 
made with sensitivity to rules and the goods they provide, but 
never fully determined by them (pp. 100-01). 
Given the correlativity conception of political legitimacy, 
Greene’s rejection of political obligation means that the state is 
illegitimate, at least in the sense that it has no right to demand 
obedience from those subject to its control. Rather, on Greene’s 
view, the state has what he calls “permeable sovereignty,” which 
is contrasted with “plenary” sovereignty (p. 33). A state has 
plenary sovereignty when it has the moral right to require that its 
subjects obey all of its laws. Its sovereignty is permeable when its 
demands for obedience must be weighed in the balance with 
citizens’ other sources of moral obligation. In some cases, the 
state may nevertheless be justified in imposing duties to obey 
specific laws. That will be true when following the law is morally 
required, regardless of the state’s demands for compliance, as in 
 
 15. See SIMMONS, supra note 3, chs. 3–7 (rejecting arguments from consent, tacit 
consent, fair play, the natural duty of justice, and gratitude); see also A. John Simmons, 
Associative Political Obligations, 106 ETHICS 247 (1996) (rejecting arguments from 
association obligation).  
 16. Greene borrows the phrase from FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE 
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW 
AND IN LIFE 97 (1991).  
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the case of laws prohibiting murder and other mala in se crimes. 
But the state may be able to justify imposing duties in other 
cases as well, when all-things-considered, the morally right 
course of action is to follow its commands. The rejection of 
general, content-independent, political obligations is thus 
compatible with the existence of duties to comply with certain 
laws. Such duties may be justified by various considerations 
underlying some of the standard accounts of political obligation 
(e.g., consent, fair play, social coordination), or some 
combination of those considerations. Whether any particular 
demand for compliance is justified, however, must be assessed 
independently and on its own merits, without relying on the 
notion that the state has any general claim to a presumption in 
favor of its moral authority. 
B. EXEMPTIONS AS PARTIAL REMEDIES 
A state with permeable sovereignty will sometimes be 
justified in imposing moral duties and demanding that its 
subjects comply with them. But when the state lacks such 
authority, Greene argues that it ought to provide exit options 
through legal exemptions. Of course, as Hume long ago 
recognized,17 most people are in no position to exit the state. The 
costs are too high for emigration to be an either realistic or 
reasonable option (p. 117). Instead, Greene suggests, legal 
exemptions can serve as “[r]epresentations of exit” (p. 114). By 
accommodating conscientious objectors, the state provides a 
“partial remedy” for its unjustified impositions upon them. 
Exemptions cannot fully remedy the state’s illegitimacy, since 
they cannot establish the conditions for the state’s right to 
demand general obedience. But a robust exemption regime can 
at least ameliorate conflicts between the state and those who 
claim that they cannot, in good conscience, comply with the law 
(pp. 114–15). 
Greene adopts a balancing approach to legal exemptions. 
To screen out frivolous cases, he argues that conscientious 
objectors should be required to initiate claims against the state 
(pp. 118–19), and they must show that the law substantially 
burdens their sincere religious or moral views (p. 130). If an 
objector establishes these elements of a claim, the burden shifts 
to the state to show, on a case-by-case basis, that granting an 
 
 17. David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND 
LITERARY 462 (Eugene F. Miller ed., 1985).  
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exemption would threaten a compelling state interest. Thus, the 
right to a legal exemption is not absolute, but merely prima facie. 
Claims for exemptions can be defeated if the state can 
demonstrate that it is morally justified in requiring compliance 
with the law (p. 123). 
Although nearly all of Greene’s examples of exemptions 
involve religious claims, it is worth emphasizing that his moral 
argument from permeable sovereignty is not limited to those 
with religious objections but rather “includes all deeply held 
sources of normative authority” (p. 124). In extending his theory 
in this way, Greene departs from existing and prior First 
Amendment doctrine, which has never explicitly authorized 
exemptions for overtly non-religious claims of conscience. 
Given the breadth of its scope, Greene’s theory of 
“represented exit” sits uneasily next to his earlier claim, which 
he repeats here for consideration as a possible “stand-alone 
argument” (p. 149), that religious believers have a special 
constitutional right to judicial exemptions, one that does not 
apply to those with non-religious claims of conscience. I have 
already mentioned the outlines of this argument above,18 and 
elsewhere I have offered various criticisms of it.19 For now, I 
merely observe the incongruity of claiming a special set of legal 
exemptions for religious conscientious objectors, when the entire 
argument would appear to be swamped by larger considerations 
stemming from Greene’s more general denial of political 
obligation. If the First Amendment states a case for privileging 
religious over non-religious conscientious claims,20 Greene would 
seem to be in a good position to criticize the law for failing to 
provide non-believers with some positive basis for adjudicating 
their prima facie claims of conscience. It is puzzling why he is so 
circumspect about the constitutional rights of non-believers.21 
 
 18. See Greene, supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
 19. See Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special? 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1351, 1390–95 (2012). 
 20. I have suggested some possible interpretations of the First Amendment that 
close the gap between religious and non-religious claims of conscience. See id. at 1414–26. 
 21. Greene acknowledges that “[o]ne could construct an argument for judicial 
exemptions beyond religious practice, as a matter of constitutional right” (p. 116), and he 
briefly mentions some possibilities without settling on anything specific and, for that 
matter, without stating that non-religious conscientious objectors are morally entitled to 
exemptions as a matter of constitutional law. 
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II. WHY NOT ANARCHISM? 
Despite the title of his book, and his forceful attack on 
political and interpretive obligations, Greene claims that he does 
not “endorse anarchism, of either the philosophical or political 
stripe” (p. 32). Indeed, Greene is concerned enough about the 
risk of being labeled an anarchist that he repeats his denial in the 
book’s penultimate paragraph, declaring that his “argument is 
not for anarchy” and that “government may play a role . . . in 
seeking and perhaps even achieving a more harmonious 
republic” (p. 253). These statements abjuring anarchism are 
difficult to reconcile with Greene’s views about political 
obligation, which seem to place him squarely within the skeptical 
tradition of philosophical anarchism that has been developed 
and refined over the last few decades with greater clarity, 
precision, and sophistication than ever before.22 
Greene’s rejection of philosophical anarchism is 
unpersuasive. This is primarily because he accepts the two main 
propositions to which all anarchists are committed, namely, that 
all states are politically illegitimate and that there is no general 
duty to obey the law.23 Indeed, at times, Greene appears to 
embrace a strong version of philosophical anarchism, what 
Simmons calls a priori anarchism, which holds that it is morally 
impossible for citizens to give presumptive authority to the 
state.24 According to Greene, citizens cannot consent or take 
some other voluntary action (such as receiving benefits from the 
state), inhabit some role or status, or defer to a practical 
authority in a manner that creates a general obligation to obey 
the law. As he says: “One can never displace the authority for a 
normative judgment” (p. 101). Of course, citizens may be 
morally required to comply with specific laws. But no anarchist 
denies that proposition. The central question is whether there 
are, and indeed could ever be, general political obligations, and, 
assuming the correlativity conception of legitimacy, whether the 
 
 22. See especially A. John Simmons, Philosophical Anarchism, in FOR AND 
AGAINST THE STATE 19–39 (John T. Sanders & Jan Narveson eds., 1996). Simmons’ 
essay, which is the clearest and most sophisticated exposition of philosophical anarchism 
to date, is reprinted in SIMMONS, supra note 4, ch. 6. 
 23. See SIMMONS, supra note 4, at 107 (“This, we may say, is the minimum moral 
content of anarchist judgments of state illegitimacy: the subjects of illegitimate states 
have no political obligations.”). 
 24. In contrast to a priori anarchism, a posteriori anarchism holds that while it is 
possible for states to have political legitimacy and, correlatively, for citizens to have 
political obligations, no actually existing states are legitimate, and no citizens (or very 
few) have political obligations. See id.at 104–07. 
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state is, or could ever be, politically legitimate. To the extent he 
rejects political obligation and its logical correlate, political 
legitimacy, Greene does, in fact, embrace the central tenets of 
philosophical anarchism. 
Greene attempts to resist this conclusion in a few ways. 
First, he identifies weaker conceptions of political legitimacy 
that the state might satisfy. The legality conception mentioned 
above is one possibility. Since many states maintain recognized 
and effective legal systems that comply with and promote rule of 
law values, Greene says this “version of political legitimacy is all 
around us” (p. 32). But this response cannot distinguish 
Greene’s view from philosophical anarchism, because he 
concedes that the legality conception is not sufficient to generate 
political obligations. States may have the moral authority to 
impose some laws, but acknowledging that fact does not yield a 
right to demand general compliance with the law. 
Second, Greene argues that unlike philosophical anarchists, 
he believes the state is justified in providing important public 
goods, which private action, including the use of markets, is 
incapable of supplying (p. 33). But this response is based on a 
conflation of the distinction noted above between the state’s 
justification and its legitimacy.25 Although a state might be 
morally justified in the sense that it is effective in solving 
coordination problems or in maintaining decent and even just 
institutions, it might nevertheless be politically illegitimate in not 
having the right to demand general obedience to its laws.26 
Sensitivity to the distinction between justification and legitimacy 
allows philosophical anarchists to say exactly what Greene wants 
to say, which is that states may have significant moral virtues, 
even if they lack presumptive moral authority. 
Finally, Greene distinguishes his position from anarchism 
by claiming that, on his view, “we do better living under the rule 
of a government in a liberal democracy than we would 
otherwise” (p. 5). One might wonder why, if this is the case, 
Greene does not reject the correlativity thesis and claim that 
liberal democratic states are politically legitimate in the sense of 
being morally justified, even if they cannot always demand 
compliance with the law. But philosophical anarchism has a 
 
 25. See supra notes 12–14, and accompanying text. 
 26. See SIMMONS, supra note 3, at 198 (“Governments which are just and beneficial, 
as well as responsive and open to change are not reduced to the level of tyrannical 
government simply because they share with it ‘illegitimacy’ in the traditional sense.”). 
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response to this question, relying again on the distinction 
between justification and legitimacy. The answer is that we do 
better living under many institutions and associations—including 
some religious organizations, corporations, universities, etc.—
but that does not give them the right to coerce our compliance 
with their rules and regulations. We might be better off living in 
a world with Google in it. Perhaps Google can provide 
important goods that no other firm can supply. But that does not 
give Google the moral right to compel our use of its services.27 
My point here is not to press the argument for philosophical 
anarchism, except perhaps to avoid certain confusions about it, 
which I think Greene’s rejection of it may unfortunately 
encourage. Early in his book, Greene acknowledges that his 
conclusions “may seem frightening (are we living in a state of 
nature? should we be taking up arms against this illegitimate 
force?)” (p. 5). Repudiating philosophical anarchism might be 
seen as a way to alleviate such concerns. But this is a mistake. 
Philosophical anarchism may not be the correct view of political 
legitimacy or political obligation, but it does not necessarily lead 
to an endorsement of lawlessness, civil disobedience, or armed 
resistance to the state, and certainly no more than Greene’s view 
does. Instead of dismissing philosophical anarchism as a 
fearsome and potentially violent doctrine, Greene’s argument 
against political obligation and in favor of permeable sovereignty 
is more consistently interpreted, I think, as a contribution to 
anarchical political philosophy, which is itself part of a 
respectable tradition of skeptical moral reflection about the 
nature and limits of state authority. 
III. HOW (NOT) TO JUSTIFY LEGAL EXEMPTIONS 
I have suggested that Greene has no reason to reject 
philosophical anarchism given his stated commitments. But 
proponents of legal exemptions for conscientious objectors may 
have different reasons to be concerned about relying on 
anarchical claims or similar arguments based on the denial of 
political obligations. More specifically, Greene’s argument that 
the state should grant exemptions as a partial remedy for its 
illegitimacy may not be sufficient to account for an important 
range of cases, including some paradigmatic examples of 
religious accommodation. In such cases, Greene’s remedial 
 
 27. See SIMMONS, supra note 4, at 136. 
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strategy may be less successful than more familiar, and perhaps 
less philosophically controversial, arguments based on the values 
of freedom and equality. 
To illustrate this concern, consider a few cases that Greene 
mentions as examples in which exemptions are justified under 
his remedial theory. The first is Goldman v. Weinberger,28 in 
which a Jewish chaplain challenged an Air Force regulation that 
prohibited him from wearing a yarmulke indoors. This might 
seem like an easy case for Greene. The chaplain has a sincere 
religious obligation to wear a yarmulke, and the state has no 
serious countervailing interest. Because the state cannot justify 
the law, at least not as applied in these circumstances, and 
because Goldman has no obligation to obey it, the state should 
remedy its illegitimate imposition of the law by granting an 
exemption. 
But Goldman turns out not to be so simple under Greene’s 
theory. The chaplain in that case might well have had a specific 
duty to obey the law. After all, he not only volunteered to serve 
in the military, and to draw a salary from the state, but as a 
military officer, he also swore allegiance to uphold the laws of 
the United States. Under these circumstances, there are 
colorable arguments under fair play and consent theories that 
Goldman had an obligation to comply with military regulations. 
Even if his receipt of public benefits and his oath of allegiance 
were not sufficient to obligate him in perpetuity to obey all 
otherwise valid laws—though some philosophical anarchists 
might well consider his consent binding in this way—taken 
together these voluntary actions undermine any claim that 
Goldman was morally unencumbered in his relationship with the 
state. If he did have a duty to obey the law, then he was not 
entitled on that basis to an exemption on remedial grounds.29 
 
 28. 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
 29. Relying on his earlier theory of religious exemptions, Greene might respond 
here that Goldman had an independent basis for claiming an exemption, namely, that his 
religious views were excluded in the legislative process, pursuant to the Establishment 
Clause’s secular purpose requirement. Because his religious beliefs were not taken into 
account in the formation of the military’s regulations, Goldman had no prima facie 
obligation to obey them when they burdened his religious practice. For reasons I have 
given elsewhere, see Schwartzman, supra note 19, at 1390–95, I think this argument fails. 
But here I would add two further points: first, this argument will not be available in cases 
when the conscientious objector’s claim is non-religious. A secular military officer would 
not be in a position to invoke it. Second, it is not clear that harms from political exclusion 
will always be sufficient to overcome obligations incurred on the basis of fair play 
considerations or through informed consent. A person who knowingly and voluntarily 
accepts public benefits (especially if they are excludable goods), or who freely consents 
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If the problem in Goldman is that the state could demand at 
least a limited duty to obey, in others cases the difficulty will be 
that the state has not coercively enforced compliance with the 
law. For example, in the paradigmatic case of Employment 
Division v. Smith,30 two Native Americans were fired from their 
jobs for consuming peyote, which was a banned substance under 
state and federal law. If the case had involved a criminal 
prosecution, it might have been fairly straightforward under 
Greene’s theory, since the state almost certainly lacked a 
compelling interest to enforce its prohibition on the sacramental 
use of peyote. But Smith was not about a challenged criminal 
conviction; rather, it involved the state’s denial of a claim for 
unemployment compensation.31 The claimants in Smith were 
seeking a public benefit in the form of financial assistance from 
the state. Setting aside that they might thereby incur fair play 
obligations to comply with state policies, the state did not 
impose upon them any requirement to claim unemployment 
compensation. They were not under any moral or legal duty to 
seek or accept state benefits and were not, in that sense, coerced 
by the state. They were incidentally burdened, and perhaps 
wrongly so, but it is not obvious that the wrong involved had 
anything to do with the state coercively imposing upon them a 
duty to obey the law. 
Even if the claimants in Smith could assert that they were 
indirectly coerced by the state conditioning access to public 
benefits on compliance with an unjust law, there may be other 
cases in which parties seeking accommodations cannot easily 
claim that they were either directly or indirectly coerced to obey 
the law. For example, in Kiryas Joel,32 a community of Satmar 
Hasidic Jews lobbied the New York state legislature to create a 
special school district, ostensibly for the purpose of educating 
the community’s handicapped children, who had suffered 
emotional trauma attending secular schools.33 The question in 
the case was whether the state’s effort to assist the Satmar 
community was an impermissible religious accommodation 
 
to serve in a particular role, might incur specific obligations even if that person’s 
convictions were not accounted for in the provision of those benefits or in the creation of 
that role. Of course, as discussed below, there might be other reasons to accommodate 
even those who have incurred obligations through fair play or consent. But a remedy for 
illegitimately imposing a duty to obey will not be among them. 
 30. Emp’t Div. v. Smith 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 31. Id. at 874. 
 32. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). 
 33. Id. at 690–93. 
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under the Establishment Clause. (The Supreme Court held that 
it was.34) But if the question had been whether the state had a 
duty to provide financial support for a separate religious school, 
the Satmar would have had no valid claim on the state, especially 
not under a theory of religious exemptions as partial remedies 
for the state’s political illegitimacy. The state did not require the 
Satmar to send their children to public schools or to secular 
private schools.35 Nor did it impose or attempt to coerce 
obedience with any law that conflicted with their religious 
obligations. Far from seeking a remedy for an illegitimate 
demand that they obey the law, the Satmar participated in the 
political system—quite successfully, as it turned out—to obtain 
state subsidies for what Greene describes as a “partial exit” from 
the broader social and political community (p. 146). But notice 
that we are now a long way off from remedying the state’s 
political illegitimacy through exit from the law. The 
accommodation in Kiryas Joel is not about allowing for exit, but 
rather about actively promoting and subsidizing it. 
None of the religious accommodations claimed in these 
three cases—Goldman, Smith, and Kiryas Joel—fits easily within 
Greene’s remedial theory. Two of them, Goldman and Smith, 
are probably better justified on more familiar grounds involving 
the values of freedom and equality. Goldman need not deny that 
he has a prima facie duty to obey the law to make out a claim for 
a religious exemption. He can admit having such a duty, but 
claim that the state ought to respect his religious liberty by 
granting him a minor exception from its uniform regulations. He 
can also argue that failure to grant such an exemption is a form 
of religious discrimination, since it is highly unlikely that a 
religious majority would impose a burden on its own members’ 
religious practices based on such an inconsequential state 
interest.36 The same arguments from freedom and equality would 
hold, mutatis mutandis, for the Native Americans in Smith. Even 
if they were not directly coerced by the state, and even if they 
had some prima facie obligation to comply with state policies 
regulating receipt of public benefits, they can argue that the state 
better respects the freedom of conscience if it does not require 
 
 34. Id. at 698 (“[A] State may not delegate its civic authority to a group chosen 
according to a religious criterion.”). 
 35. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding the state could not compel 
Amish parents to send their children to school beyond the 8th grade). 
 36. For development of this line of argument, see CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & 
LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 88–89 (2007). 
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citizens to choose between accepting public benefits and 
adhering to their religious beliefs and practices. And they can 
also argue that a religious majority obviously would not ban its 
own sacramental use of a drug, including alcohol, except perhaps 
under exceptional circumstances. That the majority did so in this 
case either reflected neglectful indifference or religious dis-
crimination.37 
Perhaps the Satmar in Kiryas Joel could make similar 
appeals to freedom of conscience and equality, but their case 
does not fit the conventional pattern of religious exemptions 
from the law. Furthermore, their demand for what effectively 
amounts to state delegation of jurisdictional control raises 
numerous and difficult questions about whether and to what 
extent the state should treat religious groups as sovereign 
powers, let alone subsidize the illiberal among them.38 Although 
Greene offers a thoughtful and sophisticated discussion of these 
issues, his claim that the state should underwrite the “partial 
exit” of insular religious communities seems to beg the question 
of what they are exiting from when the state has not imposed 
any moral duty or otherwise placed any coercive burden upon 
them. 
CONCLUSION 
Greene’s argument against political obligation and in favor 
of permeable sovereignty is a substantial and valuable 
philosophical undertaking. It is creative, thought-provoking, and 
an important contribution, especially to the literature on 
religious exemptions. In evaluating his attempt to link obligation 
and exemption, I have raised two questions. The first is whether 
Greene is committed to philosophical anarchism, despite his 
insistence to the contrary. For lay readers (and perhaps some 
philosophers as well), anarchism may have scary connotations. 
But when carefully described, certain forms of philosophical 
anarchism are committed to a balance-of-reasons approach to 
moral and political obligations that shares much with, and may 
indeed be identical to, the account Greene offers in his book. 
 
 37. See id. at 92–93. 
 38. I have elsewhere expressed skepticism about the idea of treating religious 
institutions as sovereigns, at least in the sense of exercising political and coercive power. 
See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Lost in 
Translation: A Dilemma for Freedom of the Church, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
(forthcoming 2013). 
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Clarity on this point is important for analytical purposes, but 
also because philosophical anarchism is easily misunderstood 
and sometimes mischaracterized in the existing literature. 
The second question is about the limits of a theory of 
exemptions based on the idea of remedying political illegitimacy. 
Even if Greene can distinguish his account from philosophical 
anarchism, his view rests on controversial claims about the 
nature of political authority and the extent of our obligations as 
citizens. Those claims are at least as contentious as arguments 
for exemptions based on the values of freedom of conscience 
and equality, and it is not entirely clear what is gained by 
framing the debate about exemptions in terms of political 
obligation. As I have tried to suggest, in many cases, questions 
about duties to obey the law do not seem to be centrally at issue 
in deciding whether exemptions are justified. And even when the 
duty to obey is implicated, other arguments may be sufficient to 
determine the issue. In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that 
the debate about political obligation is unimportant or 
irrelevant—far from it. My point is rather that the question of 
whether to grant exemptions extends beyond whether we have 
duties to obey. It is a question about the state’s justification—
that is, about whether the state acts justly—and not only about 
its legitimacy. 
 
